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Abandoning ineffective medical practices and mitigating the risks of untested practices are important for improving
patient health and containing healthcare costs. Historically, this process has relied on the evidence base,
societal values, cultural tensions, and political sway, but not necessarily in that order. We propose a conceptual
framework to guide and prioritize this process, shifting emphasis toward the principles of evidence-based medicine,
acknowledging that evidence may still be misinterpreted or distorted by recalcitrant proponents of entrenched
practices and other biases.
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Divesting from ineffective and harmful medical practices
has the potential to improve outcomes for patients, and
mitigate the unsustainable rise in healthcare costs. Aban-
donment (de-implementation) of medical interventions may
depend on multiple factors. Empirical evidence from well-
designed studies should count, but other considerations
such as inertia, financial and professional conflicts, cultural
and societal values, knowledge brokering, and lobbying
may also be very important eventually. The question is how
we can position evidence so as to be more informative
and influential in these complex processes. Here we
provide a framework to guide the evidence-based de-
implementation of interventions, acknowledging how on-
the-ground realities can enter these considerations. Broadly,
we will consider three categories of healthcare practices:
those that are known not to work; those for which the evi-
dence base is uncertain; and those that are in development
and where strategic preemptive placement of evidence may
help their eventual de-implementation, if needed. While
the examples herein draw upon our experience appraising* Correspondence: jioannid@stanford.edu
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article, unless otherwise stated.medical practices, the principles are broadly applicable to
all healthcare fields.Contradicted established medical practices
The number of medical practices where the best evidence
shows no efficacy or harms outweighing benefits is
substantial. One search produced over 150 potentially
ineffective or unsafe practices [1], and empirical reviews of
high impact medical journals have generated over 140
reversed medical practices [2].
When large, well-done randomized trials have contra-
dicted current medical practice, de-implementation makes
sense, but it can meet with fierce tactical resistance.
Proponents of contradicted medical practices can procure
not only editorials, but also counter-evidence that cuts
corners, e.g. focusing on lesser endpoints, highlighting
subgroup analyses, or performing additional studies with
straw man controls. Expert-based meta-analyses with
tailored eligibility criteria and outcome selection to show
some benefit [3], and conflicted expert guidelines can
follow suit [4].
Take for example the 2007 COURAGE study, which
found that among patients with coronary artery disease and
stable angina, routine percutaneous coronary intervention
(PCI) was no better than an initial strategy of optimal
medical treatment (OMT). In the month following
the study’s publication, PCI and stenting was down 13%Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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prepublication levels [5]. Not only has COURAGE and
corroborating meta-analyses [6,7] failed to stem the use
of PCI, but it appears that they have also not improved
adherence to OMT at time of PCI [8]. Proponents of
stenting criticized COURAGE, citing selection bias, cross-
over, and poor study power [9]. Then, in 2012, FAME 2
showed that PCI guided by fractional flow reserve testing
could decrease rates of revascularization compared to
OMT, though there were no differences in cardiac death,
myocardial infarction, or stroke [10]. Yet the results of
FAME 2 and COURAGE are comparable. Regarding
revascularization, 10 stents were placed to avert 1 future
revascularization procedure in FAME 2, and 12 stents
achieved that goal in COURAGE. Whether PCI was
guided by angiography or fractional flow, the net result
is similar.
Moreover, multiple meta-analyses of PCI co-authored
by interventional cardiologists and/or sponsored by
the industry claimed benefits in PCI by pooling together
trials of stable angina and trials with residual ischemia,
transferring the benefits of the latter population to
the former. Practice guidelines then could follow the
same path.
Another example is the routine use of gown and glove
precautions among patients colonized with resistant
pathogens, which is supported only by quasi-experimental,
before-and-after, studies [11]. Yet, to date, two cluster-
randomized trials have failed to support the benefits of this
practice [12,13]. One study showed no reduction in the
transmission of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
or vancomycin-resistant enterococcus [13], and the other
showed no difference in rates of colonization or infection
with these two pathogens [12]. These studies have
failed to change this practice, however, and editorial
ambivalence continues [14]. Some have even claimed
that ‘the likelihood of harm (more than clear evidence
of benefit) should drive the decision to implement’
[15], i.e. considering de-implementation only after
contact precautions are proven to be harmful, not
merely ineffective. Such resistance to adhere to the
best available evidence inflates healthcare costs, and
may distract from alternative strategies with promising
early results of efficacy, such as universal decolonization
protocols [16].
In brief, evidence wars can hinder de-implementa-
tion, and ‘practice resuscitation’ may be successful at
reclaiming lost market shares. Of course, it is entirely
possible that some subgroup truly benefits when a
practice has ‘negative’ results globally, or that some
lesser endpoints are meaningful to patients. Yet, more
often such counter-evidence resurrection studies sim-
ply create excuses to not abandon the contradicted
practice.We propose a simple standard to curb such practice
resuscitation: The evidence to revive a contradicted
medical practice (whether in part or in whole) should
involve endpoints and controls at least as rigorous as the
contradictory study. Until such evidence is obtained,
payers may offer disincentives by placing restrictions to
reimbursement, and regulators may consider revoking or
restricting prior approvals.
Unproven medical practices
Clearly contradicted practices are less common than
unproven ones. Among 1,344 articles assessing a medical
practice, 363 (27%) tested standard of care, with 146
(11% of the total) contradicting it [2]. Many medical
practices are largely untested or have insufficient evidence.
An empirical evaluation of the Cochrane Database of
Systematic Reviews found that the existing evidence
base was unable to support or refute 49% of interven-
tions [17], and 48% of American College of Cardiology
recommendations were supported by expert opinion
only [18].
A rational strategy to de-implement medical practices
supported by little to no evidence is to subject them
to testing in systematic fashion. Ideally, this assessment
would be performed under the auspices of non-conflicted
bodies, possibly within existing governmental structures,
such as the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.
Table 1 highlights potential considerations to prioritize
untested medical practices. Likely major considerations
include the extant evidence base of a practice — preference
should be given to those based on the least evidence —
and the cost and ubiquity of the practice — preference
given to those practices placing the largest burden on the
healthcare system. Additional considerations include the
presence of alternative choices in a field — preference
given toward reappraising fields with many alternatives of
varying class, price, and evidence base; practices with
clearly documented harms; practices where the cost
to obtain the necessary evidence is contained; and
practices where the results of trials with unfavorable
results may realistically change minds and practice.
Formal approaches, such as value of information
calculations [19] may be applied, investigating the
value of specific proposed randomized trials towards
de-implementing established unproven practices.
Novel medical practices
With multiple novel interventions (therapeutic, diagnostic,
prognostic, healthcare system, and other) being introduced
in medical care, a key consideration is to take preemptive
steps that would allow efficient de-implementation if the
intervention eventually proves inefficient and harmful.
While there is increasing pressure to adopt novel inter-
ventions before substantial evidence has been obtained
Table 1 Potential considerations in prioritizing the testing of unproven medical practices
Factor to consider General principle How to implement this factor
Prior evidence
base
Priority should be given to practices where
the present evidence base is weakest.
For instance, a tiered system may be utilized: Level 1 (Weak)
Randomized trials of interventions claiming subjective benefits,
that are unblinded or fail to use proper controls. 2 (Weaker)
Historically controlled studies of interventions that purport
survival benefits, case series documenting improvements in
subjective endpoints and quasi-experimental studies. 3 (Weakest)
Practices based on pathophysiology and expert opinion alone. In
many cases, professional conflicts may also prove problematic;
thus, it may be reasonable to pursue this technique using
content-specific experts in strictly an advisory capacity
Cost/ubiquity Priority should be given to interventions
with significant net financial burden on health payers.
For instance, orthopedic procedures for chronic back and joint
pain, including knee and hip replacement surgeries are widely
utilized in the United States, incur large financial burden on
payers, but have little evidence of sustained long term benefits.
Alternative options Priority should be given to practices for which there are
several alternative options, particularly if alternatives are of
completely different mechanisms (thus unlikely to also be
overturned), or of low cost or bolstered by stronger evidence.
For instance, consider the market for anti-rheumatologic agents.
Maintenance treatment of rheumatoid arthritis (RA) with disease
modifying agents (DMARDS) has historically relied upon oral
anti-immunologic agents such as methotrexate, azathiaprine,
cyclosporin, and hydroxychloroquine. Recent years have witnessed
a boom in novel drugs, typically expensive monoclonal antibodies
against circulating cytokines or cell surface receptors. To date,
this market has been limited by paucity of head to head trials,
and, of trials that have been conducted, the majority are
industry-sponsored studies. Collectively, there remains clinical
uncertainty about how best to use these agents [20].
Documented
harms
Priority should be given to test practices where the harms
are well documented and confer substantial morbidity.
For instance, there is growing awareness of strut fracturization,
embolism, and migration of IVC filters. At the same time, the
IVC filter has never shown to improve any patient-centered
outcome for any patient population in a prospective trial, and




Priority should be given to test practices where the cost
to test is far less than ongoing expenditures of the practice.
In some respects, trialists should think like CEOs, weighing the
costs of conducting a study, which may find a practice
ineffective versus the ongoing expenditures for that practice.
At times, such calculations may favor costly trials where the
existing evidence base is weak, observational studies suggest
inefficiencies, and the ongoing costs are large [22]. At other
times, small trials that eliminate boutique practices may be
employed [23]. Whose financial bottom line is being affected is
important to consider. For that reason, nonconflicted bodies
should make these determinations, utilizing investigators
without financial conflicts of interest.
Proponents are
open-minded
Priority should be given to test practices where
negative results may truly gain traction.
Some specialties (primary care providers) may be more ready
to abandon contradicted medical practices, and it is reasonable
to test practices when there is genuine belief that
contradiction can gain traction. Furthermore, some practices
may be cumbersome (tight glycemic control in the ICU),
time-consuming (routine gown and glove precautions) or
unpleasant, and their contradiction may also be palatable.
Finally, as payment structures shift from fee for service towards
bundles [24], costly components may lose faithful disciples.
Other fields, those with numerous and hyperbolic third party
advocates, have been notoriously unwilling to trust results that
undermine their worldview, no matter how robust the science.
Value of
information gained
Priority should be based on the expected value of
funding a specific study that may inform de-implementation,
at the size and cost proposed.
Value of information (VOI) offers a decision-making framework
that tries to capture several of the above issues, at least the
ones that can be best quantified [19]. VOI can be used to
prioritize and power clinical trials taking into account the costs
of increasing study sample size, the potential number of
persons affected by changes in that practice, the costs of the
practice, including downstream costs, and the increased
knowledge of marginal changes in health outcomes that
may result from testing — converting all to the final common
denominator of cost per favorable outcome gained.
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Box 1: Note from the editors
The Editors-in-Chief of Implementation Science invited this editorial
following a consultation with our editorial team and Editorial Board.
They identified “de-implementation“ as an important theme, which
deserves more attention than it currently receives. We regard
de-implementation broadly as “stopping practices that are not
evidence-based”. We encourage further papers on this theme
and will include these in a special article series in the journal to
enhance their visibility. All submissions will be reviewed and
handled according to our normal procedures. In addition, we
welcome and encourage comments in response to the
accompanying editorial, using the comment feature of the
journal’s platform. These comments, while moderated, are
intended to stimulate discussion and debate within the
implementation research community. In both papers and
comments, we welcome a range of perspectives and rigorous
studies on the theme of de-implementation, including
(but not limited to) contributions that cover psychological,
organizational or economic factors. We intend to promote other
themes in the future.
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practices is to restrict their use prior to widespread
dissemination, as demonstrated by the case of percu-
taneous transluminal angioplasty and stenting (PTAS)
for intracranial stenosis.
In 2005, the Wingspan intracranial artery stent was
granted humanitarian device exemption from the US Food
and Drug Administration, based upon provisional data
that it could improve intracranial artery lumen diameter
in patients with stenosis refractory to medical ther-
apy [25]. However, the single, uncontrolled study
that led to approval was unable to inform any
patient-centered endpoint. In 2006, Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) announced
that they would pay for the procedure only within
the confines of a randomized trial. They adhered to such a
position, despite pressure from the manufacturer in 2008
[26].
In 2011, the only randomized study of the device, the
SAMMPRIS trial, found that PTAS among patients with a
recent transient ischemic attack (TIA) or stroke and
documented stenosis of a major intracranial artery
nearly tripled the 30-day risk of stroke or death com-
pared to optimal medical management (14.7% versus
5.8%) [27].
During the years it was approved but trial data was
lacking, CMS’s policy dramatically limited off-protocol
use of the device and effectively protected the public.
Altogether, only a few hundred patients received the
device (200+ treated on protocol) in the US [26] —
contrast this against the millions of patients who re-
ceived PCI for stable angina. CMS’s wise 2006 deci-
sion likely averted a catastrophic outcome for thousands
of patients who might otherwise have been treated with
the device.
The lesson of PTAS is that higher upfront stan-
dards have potential to protect patients from ultim-
ately flawed care. Unfortunately, regulatory agencies
appear to move increasingly in the opposite direc-
tion, notably with the creation of the FDA’s ‘break-
through’ designation [28], and emerging guidance to
industry for expanded options of accelerated approval
[29,30] —a regulatory mechanism where developers have
historically shirked post-marketing commitments of
conducting trials examining clinically meaningful end-
points [31].
Empirical testing
The opinions that we express here may well be biased.
We believe, however, that there is no reason that experi-
mental studies cannot be leveraged to provide clarity for
health policies with broad societal repercussions. To
date, regulatory policies have been based on theory or
scant retrospective observational studies, but at leastsome policies may be tested creatively with random-
ized controlled trials [14]. For instance, novel agents
may be randomly assigned to accelerated or traditional
approval. This might help inform whether provisional
approval, wide dissemination, and subsequent confirma-
tory trials benefit or harm society more than restrict-
ive approval strategies sating robust endpoints prior
to dissemination.Conclusion
De-implementing practices reflects a recommitment
to evidence-based healthcare. This is important for
medications, devices, procedures, behavioral or psy-
chological interventions, screening and diagnostic
tests, and any other intervention undertaken by
people in the health professions. Strategies to elimin-
ate ineffective and harmful practices may help contain
healthcare spending and optimize outcomes. Ideally,
the majority of medical decisions should be supported
by robust data, with ambiguous decisions made only
within the confines of ongoing studies. However, as
we stated, rational, quantitative evidence may not
necessarily be the only or even main factor driving
healthcare decisions. Research to understand better
the other, cognitive or political factors that facilitate
or hinder de-implementation is thus also warranted
(see Box 1).
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